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I. INTRODUCTION
The questions confronting many military managers today is
how to fulfill their military manpower commitments and yet
still maintain the effectiveness of this manpower as a com-
batant element.
To this end the military manager in a " draft-free environ -
ment " has become increasingly prone to correlate higher
manpower accessions and retention with increased pay and
allowance or reenlistment bonuses (disregarding for the moment
economic aberrations as witnessed in 1974/75) . The difficulty
with this pecuniary eyesight is that it ignores a current of
unrest which permeates throughout the military. The unrest
is not necessarily quantifiable, but it represents a manifes-
tation of the individual's urge for increased recognition and
assumption of responsibility in determining one's own future.
This movement for greater "fate control" manifests itself
in many forms, both within the military and outside it. Within
the military it manifests itself in the movement toward union-
ism, albeit it uses pseudonyms to disguise its actual form [1],
and instances of Superior Court hearings, where there have
been applications for rescission of military contracts of
employment on grounds of the military's failure to comply
with recruitment promises.
The effect of the individual insisting on greater liber-
alism in the employment scene necessitates examination of the

key elements of military employment. By the use of ombudsmen,
unions, and other forms of representation and the implementa-
tion of human resource management programs and several other
insight programs, the military hopes to negate dissonances.
All of these are superficially dealing with the problem of
lack of fate control. The real problem still appears to
remain that an individual will rebel psychologically against
the strait jacket of a fixed-term contract even though his
ultimate term of duty may not be functionally related to his
dissonance.
To confront the problem of lack of fate control there has
to be an implicit acceptance that perhaps several long-vaunted
pillars of personnel administration are not only non-motivators
but also could be uneconomical.
This study, by examining initial enlistments and first
reenlistments , will attempt to show the factors that affect
the enlisted man in the prerecruitment , and first enlistment
stages. The implications for military contractual employment
of legal, social and motivational factors will also be taken
into account. To depict the situation, models will be dis-
cussed. The most important will be a model of contractual
length represented by cost and effectiveness, both elements
being of necessity limited by sample data.
The underlying theme of the study is to examine the real-
ities of the military society. A quotation from Ayn Rand [2]
effectively synthesises this theme:

To improve anything one must know what constitutes improve-
ment - and to know that one must know what is good and how
to achieve it - and to know that one must have a whole
system of value judgements. How are these values to be




II. ELEMENTS IN THE DILEMMA
With the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, and at the
same time defense budget constraints, a necessity arose to
maximize utility of the manpower presently within, or intend-
ing to join, the military. Reclassifying military positions
into civilian status is admirable only if it does not detract
from the original object of the military, i.e., to function
effectively as a combatant force. Random "civilianizing"
has two manifest elements, firstly, of derogating the military
role, and secondly, creating parity dissatisfaction between
military and civilian occupants of virtually identical posi-
tions. The additional compensation necessary to reimburse
the military member for his loss of freedom vis-a-vis the
civilian may be economically prohibitive.
It is prudent at this point to review the tenents of
military manpower planning, its effect on both the military
and the civilian environment, and its behavioral, psychological,
sociological, and economic implications.
Manpower is nowhere more critical than in the military.
During wartime control, allocation and training becomes man-
datory and is accepted unreservedly. However, in peace the
needs are still paramount, but the commitment is generally
less than optimal.
In a democracy manpower policy must balance direction
against initiative, control against freedom, and public good
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against personal desire. It must do this while still main-
taining the overall objective to benefit the people by raising
standards and stimulating economic growth without infringing
basic freedoms or denying respect for the dignity of the
individual.
The history of the U.S. military is an example of an
attempt to a balanced approach moving from a small proficient
regular military, supported by a well-organized Reserve and
National Guard, of the 1950's to the globally committed U.S.
forces of the 1970' s. The development of the military in size
has needed a corresponding growth in skilled and educated man-
power both intelligent and technically competent to meet the
demands of modern weaponry.
The military planner must consider the impact of society
upon the military. The mere concept of a military in democratic
society itself constitutes an anachronism, between freedom and
bondage, liberalism and authoritarianism.
It is vital to recognize that the society that spawns the
military should also have the power to control the might;
similarly, the rights, freedoms, and liberties of this popu-
lation should not be denied or circumscribed because an indi-
vidual decides to make a career of the military. If passive
acceptance of arbitrary control is anathema to a thriving
democracy, then why should it be so readily subscribed to as
the modus operandi for the military. To avoid alienation from
the population and creation of a mercenary force, geared only
to pecuniary incentives, constant revaluation is needed of
12

the psychological position of the military in the social
structure.
This statement, however, resolves nothing for the military
planner; the problem he still has to wrestle with is what is
the optimal time period to have an individual initially enlist
or reenlist. To determine this, in an operating atmosphere,
there is a need to first determine what the relevant factors
are that influence the individual in his choice of a military
career and what additional factors have to be acknowledged to
ensure a return to the military (assumed productivity or
effectiveness) is maximized. Finally by the integration of
these two streams there should be revealed a range of preferred
employment contract periods.
Specifically, there are three factors to be aware of.
These are:
1) Attitudes towards military employment
2) Individual's stages of development
3) Cost-effectiveness of any course of action and the
benefits it will yield the military.
The above factors could be viewed as constraints, although
some are qualitative; the need still arises to mentally
attribute a weighting to each of them. This weighting in
turn is a function of the area under consideration, either
enlistment or reenlistmer. t , and the social and economic
climate prevailing at the time.
13

A. ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY EMPLOYMENT
Attitudes towards military employment are shaped by many
factors- -social acceptability, legal standing and career pros-
pects being but a few. The important thing about attitudes is
that they will vary depending upon the situation. Consequently,
what is an inflexible attitude of an 18-year old towards a
first-term enlistment contract may be completely reversed by
the time he reaches 22 years of age and is due to reenlist.
Ignoring this phenomena could result in the provision of
incentives to change attitudes that have already altered.
For our purposes, attitudes held by potential first- term
enlistees and potential first-term reenlistees are relevant.
By looking at several studies conducted it should enable these
attitudes to be contrasted and the relevance they have to
setting contract length gauged. Other attitudes, not so
easily gauged and certainly not researched, are those caused
by legal inequities and the non-use of performance as a basis
for promotion. An attempt at relating these to the issue of
contract length will be made.
1 . Enlistment
Most work on enlistment attitude shaping has been to
do with incentives.
The use of incentives as a device to change potential
enlistee attitudes starts with the paradigm that if you offer
people the opportunity to gain specific objects or objectives
which they value, they will change their behavior in order to
realize these values. In this way behavior theoretically can
14

be "shaped" or "maintained" in the manner desired by the
individual controlling the value reinforcements.
There are implicit assumptions in this approach. One
is that the incentives being manipulated actually represent
appreciable values and constitute sources of attraction to
the target population involved. Obviously, if they do not
they lose their effectiveness.
The second assumption is that more incentives are
better than less. Therefore, if the opportunity to realize
values will serve to change behavior, then the more "value
opportunity" that is provided (in the sense of a greater amount
of specific values or a greater variety of values) then the
greater will be the change in behavior that would take place
in the individual and the correspondingly greater the popula-
tion that would be affected.
The final assumption is that the effectiveness of an
incentive is independent of the context in which it is pre-
sented and utilized. Evidence has shown that this is not
necessarily a true assumption [3] . As a means of determining
the effect of incentives on enlistment intention, a study was
carried out for the American Institutes for Research by Frey
[4] . The study involved the sampling and analysis of reactions
of American young men to sets of incentives that might be used
by the Navy to attract recruits. The formulation of the
incentives was done in consultation with Navy personnel who




The study was a follow-on from Glickman [5] and
Korman [6] . It also used the results of the Gilbert survey
[7] on youth attitudes. Although it was found that different
incentives generally hold different values for men from
different socio-economic backgrounds, the most notable factor
that emerged from the study was the finding, in a factor
analysis, that 48 percent of the common variance was accounted
for by a desire for fate control [4] .
Using the results of several other experiments, some
of the more accepted notions of enlistment can be severely
questioned. One experiment was a nationwide sampling of
16-22-year olds stratified within geographic regions.
The experiment offered incentives in sets of singles,
doubles, and triples. Its main conclusion was that compara-
tive attractiveness was not significantly different between
the sets. In every case the double or triple incentive set
was not more or less attractive than the single set.
The 17 incentives used and the responses can be found
in Table I. A comparative attractiveness of some of the in-
centives is shown in Figure 1. It was determined that although
the double incentive packages rated higher in absolute terms
(in some cases) , in no case was the difference from its best
single component greater than could be accounted for by chance.
Even when using the approach of increasing the absolute
magnitude of single incentives--e.g
.
, increasing the enlistment
bonus from $1,000 to $3,000--it was found there was no sig-





Ratings of Experimental Incentives for Enlistment
Mean Standard
Incentives Rating* Deviation
1. Get out after 3 months if not satisfied
2. $1,000 enlistment bonus
3. Performance bonus up to 251 of base-pay
4. 2 Years college after 4 years of active
duty
5. 4 Years college after 4 years of active
duty
6. Choice of home post after 2 years of
duty
7. Special job training to start civilian
life
8. 20-Year retirement with 3/4 pay
9. Assign women to ship duty
10. 2 Months of educational leave per year
11. 2 Year enlistment period
12. $3,000 Enlistment bonus
13. Opportunity to change job specialty
after 1 year
14. Naval-pay and benefits would be the
same as civilian
15. Reduced educational requirements for
officer training programs
16. Greater sea duty-pay differential
17. 15-Year retirement at half -pay
* The rating scale ranges from 1 to 5; the higher the
value the greater the attraction for enlistment.



































































Figure 1. Relative attractiveness of the Best Single Incentive,
the Best Double Incentive and the Best Triple
Incentive Package within Each Set of Incentives.

















Figure 2. Relative Attractiveness of a $1,000 Enlistment Bonus
Compared to a $3,000 Enlistment Bonus. The ratings
range from 1 to 5; the higher the value the greater
the attraction for enlistment.
Source: Frey, Jr., et al. [4]
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The listing of overall attractiveness of incentives
(by their mean going from the highest to lowest) indicates
that not only is the top item non-pecuniary but also the top
five items emphasize mainly themes of self-determination and
educational opportunities (see Table I).
A further sophistication was achieved by eliciting
intent if the incentives were adopted. Once again the most
positive response was for a $1,000 enlistment bonus and the




Although the investigators acknowledged that the
results would appear to be contrary to common sense, it was
apparent that there was a need to turn to psychology for
answers. The first conclusion was that the individual could
perceive the increasing of incentives as a cumulative bribe
put forward to trick an individual into enlisting. The
attitude that it is "too good to be true" quickly put a limit
on the manipulation of this incentive strategy.
A second aspect was that the high incentive
violates the equity norm. That is, people will work harder
when they believe they are being overpaid. If the incentives
can be categorized as overpayment, then the implicit need to
demonstrate exceptional effort could be counterproductive to
enlistment
.
Demographically the difference in the study showed
predictably that high school students from low income families
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were more susceptible to incentives of pecuniary nature-
-
e.g., $3,000 bonus--than were college students who showed a
greater leaning towards a package of three months' enlistment
option and further educational training after completion of
enlistment
.
The overall result indicated that today's youth
places a much higher value on the shaping of his present and
future activities and life style, this attitude being shaped
and conditioned by what he has seen, learned, and come to
expect in civilian life. It was obvious from the study that
fate control incentives and pecuniary rewards are not oppo-
sites. To have a reasonable recruiting program there is a
need to have a mixture of incentives.
This movement by youth for a recognizable societal
role has been summarized by Levinson [8] as "we are in the
midst of a world-wide social reevaluation, the central thrust
of which is the demand of all people to have a role in their
own fate."
The implications for military manpower planning
are obvious, to achieve the enlistment numbers consideration
might have to be given to providing greatly reduced contract
periods or provision of "early out" if dissatisfied after a
minimum time instead of constantly boosting incentives.
Another study conducted by Glickman [5] confirms
Frey's findings. Glickman followed the individual through
his first enlistment and recognized the psychological adjust-
ment the individual would be undertaking.
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Glickman in his study depicted the development
of the individual through a series of steps (Figure 3) from
the career motivation and socialization process through to
an accommodation stage where the individual makes cognitive
reappraisals of his position.
The phase I preliminary socialization process may
crucially affect the later development of career motivation.
Generally the recruit has an idealized view of the military,
from the position of masculinity to a tacit belief that
efficiency, discipline, and good leadership are inherent in
the military institution.
The second phase is depicted as the recruit train-
ing and the individual's first duty station. At this stage
career motivation is seen as a function of the individual's
experiences early in his tour, his personal characteristics,
and the kind of preliminary socialization influences he was
subjected to before he enlisted. It is at this point where
the mass of expectations and reality meet and that the first
reality shock may start to appear. Hughes [9] terms this as
being "reality shock." Glickman uses the term "disconf irma-
tion."
This disconf irmation relates generally to assign-
ment of schools, notwithstanding the point that the initial
choice of school was generally a result of interaction with
the recruiter. Non-provision of such schools generally
resulted in dissonances.
While loss of school choice may represent the










































































effects on the individual's perceptions of the military and
his continuing motivation. This, however, is not the only
area where negative patterns appear. Perceptions of leader-
ship imbued in recruit training may be quickly tarnished by
reality contrast with operating units. Glickman [5], in his
study, uses Weitz's [10] theory to support the view that more
accurate job expectations (i.e., reality conditioning by
recruiters including knowledge of negative job aspects) would
lead to a lessening in turnover.
The third phase, in Glickman's terms the accommo-
dation phase, is when the individual tries to accommodate his
life style to the requirements of the military (Figure 3)
.
In this phase individuals who have entered with negative sets
generally have this set reinforced. Reinforcement is provided
in a self-fulfilling prophecy approach.
The attempt by Glickman was to show that individ-
uals when enlisting undergo an adjustment process; the argument
strongly put is that false job expectations generate negative
attitudes when these expectations fail to materialize.
The relevance contractually is that there are
obvious points in Glickman's model--i.e., Phase II where
flexible use of contract periods might remove some or all of
the negative dissonances (the individual knowing he can exer-
cise the right to resign) . At very least it may allow removal
with much greater expediency a dissatisfied element from the
military who represents an administrative burden.
As discussed earlier, the difficulty with atti-
tudes is their general lack of continuity as the individual
24

matures, the contrast between the first- term enlistee and the
reenlistee highlight this.
2 . Reenlistment
Previously examined were motivational factors that
would induce the individual to enlist, from a list of incen-
tives (singles or couples) , to the stages of development that
the recruit will process and the dissonances or patterns he
will develop on the way. Reenlistment itself is a product of
socio-economic dynamics, economic recession, international
crises and higher educational goals. All of these can
strengthen or weaken the attractiveness of the military as a
career prospect. Even the passage of time provides different
weightings on factors of retention, such as pay, education
and promotion.
Problems also occur demographically . As the popula-
tion ages, generally the proportion of the population in the
present prime military age group will decline. This indicates
that first-term enlistees will provide a smaller percentage
of future military manpower [11], conversely, individuals who
have the potential of enlisting two or more times will comprise
a larger percentage of possible manpower.
Greater understanding of the reenlistment decision
process is desirable, not just for the cost benefit analysis
reason, but also for use in career planning.
A study by Frey [12], following on from his study,
"Experimental Incentives - -More is Not Better," attempted to
evaluate the individual's reactions to a list of proposed
25

retention devices, this being a similar approach to the one
followed earlier where incentives were lumped together to test
the assumption that increased incentives will have a behavioral
impact. The President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Force
gave credence to this assumption when it stated that a 10%
increase in basic military pay would result in a 12.5% increase
in the enlistment rate, while a 40% pay raise would bring a
49% increase in enlistees.
A questionnaire was submitted to first-term enlisted
personnel and once again conclusively demonstrated that more
is not better.
Of the incentives tested, most support was for those
emphasizing self-determination although the importance of
traditional incentives such as retirement benefits also rated
highly. One conclusion from the study was that, with the
interaction of today's military man with his civilian environ-
ment, changes in the military way of life are constantly being
shaped by changes in the nature of civilian life. Passive
acceptance of arbitrary constraints are no longer the norm
and the latter is dysfunctional when related to enlistment
intention.
The implication gained from the study was that greater
cognizance must be given to the psychological climate rather
than purely tangible. In particular, recognition of the
vocational development of the individual as he learns more
about himself and the world will benefit the military by
allowing the individual to make "course corrections."
26

The adjusted individual would be of greater benefit both
with respect to productivity and his morale.
An extremely high proportion of respondents in the
study (51-541) opted for a three- months ' notice to quit
option. The study suggested prorating of the reenlistment
bonus as a means of overcoming financial aspects to ensure
that the reenlistee receives only what he earns. Use of a
three-months' notice to quit might ultimately assist in the
upgrading of the quality of personnel wanting to reenlist.
Another factor that appears with this option is the ease of
decision (e.g., only three-months' commitment).
The point that is easily obscured is that a person
completing a four-year enlistment is more likely to reenlist
than is the two- or three-year enlistee, thus the reduction
of enlistment time to three months could encourage the indi-
vidual to continue serving more by default than by real intent.
As he gradually perceives his increasing investment in the
military growing, and the handicaps of readjustment to civilian
life becoming more tangible, he would be more likely to stay
till the minimum retirement time. The study claims that the
loss from this option if exercised would be minimal; the main
advantage has been to the individual psychologically with his •
obvious fate control reinstated. A longitudinal study is the
only solution to an option of this type.
The conclusion from the reenlistment attitudes is that
maturation and experience appear to generate a greater need
for fate control. Although it is not desirable to reenlist
27

all initial first-term enlistees (contrast short-term to
career military) the objective should be to have as many as
possible first-term enlistees "applying" to reenlist. This
would provide greater selectivity and hopefully an upgrading
of the calibre of retained personnel.
If the use of a three -months ' notice to quit option
would achieve this, and would generate positive attitudes to
reenlist, then it may be worthwhile.
Attitudes are not developed in a vacuum. The impact
of the legal structure is becoming more evident as questions
are raised concerning constitutional and contractual rights
of potential enlistees and serving members.
3. Legal
The effect of this is reflecting mainly in first-term
enlistees at present; this group is generally questioning the
validity of military contracts terms where they have been used
by a recruiter to induce enlistment or where they have been
subsequently varied to the prejudice of a previous agreement.
If the trend continues it is conceivable that the subsequent
legalities that arise could result in radical changes in
contractual liability regardless of the military's anxiety
for them.
An important factor in many enlistees' dissonances is
the effect of the recruiter. This agency is regarded as gen-
erating a host of unmet expectations for a percentage of the
serving population. They consider that a serious discrepancy
exists between what they expected to happen in the military
and what actually occurred.
28

The promises of choice of schools and specific post-
ings have already been the basis of several law cases heard
in U.S. Superior Courts. Perhaps the stage is being set for
a complete legal rethink of military contractual employment.
The premise underlying military contracts is that the
law is biased towards the employer, the individual will only
be released at discretion of the military authorities, or at
expiration of his tour, whichever arrives first. There are
recent examples where this interpretation of the contract law
has been questioned.
In the case of Burchinall et al. vs. Secretary of the
Navy
,
District of Hawaii 74-261, 18 Dec 1974. The petitioner,
with several other members of the same rate, requested that
his contract be declared null and void and that he be given
release from the Navy. The grounds for the action centered
around an oral statement by a recruiter at time of recruitment
The court rejected Burchinall's claim but the decision by
Justice King in that case created an interesting precedent;
his obiter dictum comments were "while Burchinall stated that
his recruiter mentioned Sealab and similar projects, he does
not claim that he was promised (italics inserted) assignment
to such projects."
Read literally, this could mean that if a prospective
recruit can inveigle a recruiter into making a promise (oral
or written) then it becomes a contractual term and presents
ground for action if not complied with.
There is some consolation in the case of Parker vs
.
United States where an enlistee sued the Navy for a bonus
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promised by a recruiter. In that case it was held that the
government cannot be held liable for promises made by its
personnel
.
This consolation provides only temporary relief. The
matter was resurrected in an action brought by Carini vs.
United States of America , 74- 88-NN, U. S . District Court, New-
port, 17 Jan 75, against the Secretary of Defense by a group
of petty officers requesting release from their contract on
the grounds of the government's failure to fulfill the
plaintiffs' enlistment contracts.
The basis of this case was that the petty officers
extended their service for an additional 24 months to under-
take Nuclear Field Program or Advanced Electronic Training.
At the time of their signing, U.S. Code 37 USC 308 (g) (1968)
was in effect (referred to as the Variable Reenlistment Bonus)
guaranteeing all possessors of critical skills, who extended
or reenlisted, that they would be paid up to four times the
reenlistment bonus.
A month before the petty officers' extensions were
due to begin the Variable Reenlistment Bonus was replaced by
a Selective Reenlistment Bonus. This drastically reduced the
amount initially entitled and became the basis of the course
of action.
The decision in the case by Judge Kellam touched on
many issues. He did, however, confirm the applicability of
contract law and the binding effect of the bargain as set out
in the initial enlistment contract. He at the same time
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acknowledged the power of Congress to affect the status of an
individual in the process of raising an Army or Navy pursuant
to Article I, line 8, of the United States constitution using
the support of cases such as Schultz vs. Clifford
,
303 Supp
963 (DMinn 1968). The decision finally went against the
government on the tenuous precedent that Congress had no power
to alter a contract purely for fiscal reasons.
The decision did not greatly disturb established
contract law; what it also did not do was to preclude further
actions on a contractual law basis. Although the precedent
set by Carini will have to be of necessity restricted to its
facts of fiscal deprivation there is still sufficient evidence
available to support the view that a promised inducement dur-
ing enlistment if correctly recorded and subsequently not
complied with could result in a justifiable legal action.
Sober analysis of the facts makes it clear that
whereas previously contractual terms employed in the military
were beneficial to the employer they have now more of a burden
Questions of their validity and applicability will continue
to arise.
B. INDIVIDUAL'S STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
Apart from individual attitudes and legal problems there
is a need to be aware of the individual as he matures within
society. In this regard, to design an "iron clad" contract
of employment of such length that the individual would be
"strait- jacketed" during his formative vocational development
years it could prove inhibiting for the individual and
31

result in a loss both in morale and productivity for the
military.
When we examine vocational interests of the individual
it must be recognized that at no stage can the individual be
regarded as stagnating. Super [13], saw this as a continuum
of vocational development, from exploration to decline. He
further added:
Like social development, emotional development and intel-
lectual development, career development has both distinctive
characteristics which make focussing on it worthwhile and
common characteristics, which reveals it as one way in
which the general development of an individual manifests
itself.
Vocational choice is not a closed-door affair. A model
titled Career Maturity Inventory is a longitudinal study being
carried out by McGraw-Hill and it concentrates on two vari-
ables, career choice competencies and career choice attitudes.
Their findings to date have been that vocational behavior does
mature over time, that it is monotonic in effect, and that
measures used to determine earlier development must be mean-
ingful- - i . e . , relevent to age of maturity and ability to
differentiate age and grade levels (when applied to schools)
.
There is no one accepted view of vocational choice, the
conflicting theories being only matched by the multitude of
variables that impinge upon an individual in his maturation
process
.
A theory by Roe [14] was that the three important compon-
ents in vocational choice were the concept of psychic energy
related to early childhood, Maslow's theory and genetic
influences. This conclusion was mainly the result of examining
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certain discrete populations, such as scientists, and using
retrospective questioning. The individual's vocation as a
consequence of parental child-rearing habits probably has
some validity, but most later studies were critical of the
methodology employed in the study.
Holland [15] took the view that career choice was an
extension of personality, that people project views of them-
selves and the world of work into occupational titles. The
use of a "Modal" personality was depicted as being either
realistic, intellectual, social, conventional, enterprising
or artistic. The level of aspiration with this Modal person-
ality is dependent upon intelligence and self-evaluation.
Inadequate self-evaluation, the lack of clear ideas of
development, heirarchical family pressures, and economic
conditions were all factors that were not encompassed in the
study.
The Ginsberg, Axelrad and Herma [15] theory was the result
of an investigation into the character of events influencing
vocational selection. Vocational choice was seen as an irre-
versible process occurring in reasonably clearly marked
periods. It was characterized by a series of compromises
made by the individual between his wishes and possibilities.
The theory characterized the states of vocational evolution:
fantasy, tentative, and realistic. The realistic period is
of most interest to our study. It is generally in the age
group 19-21 and is further broken down into exploration and
crystallization stages. The former represents the stage of
integration of likes and dislikes relative to his capability,
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relating them both to society's and his own values. The
crystallization stage is the choice of some vocational pattern
based upon successes or failures during the exploration phase.
In the crystallization stage the individual receives feedback
within a highly realistic environment. The greatest value of
this theory was seen to be its ability to identify the indi-
vidual's stage of development.
Super [16] adopted a developmental self-concept theory.
In this theory he proposed that a person striving to implement
his self -concepts will choose the occupation most likely to
permit him self-expression. This, in turn, is a function of
the individual's stage of life and development. Super char-
acterized vocational development into five groups, which were:
1) Crystallization of vocational preference: 14-18 age
group.
2) Specification of vocational preference: 18-21 years.
Narrowing of general career direction into a specific
one with necessary steps to implement decision.
3) Implementation of vocational preference: 21-25 age
group.
4) Stabilization: 25-35 years. Settling into career,
appropriateness of choice.
5) Consolidation of status: 30-40 years. Firm establish-
ment of skills and seniority to generate a secure and
comfortable vocational position.
Super took another approach to the problem of vocational
choice. In this other study [13] he attempted to characterize
the effect on individuals of economic factors. By examining
supply and demand fluctuations over a period of time, he
concluded that, when a college graduate tried to enter a
profession where supply exceeded demand, either a permanent
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change could occur in the individual's plans or, for those
who do enter the profession, lower career prospects result.
Lack of promotion could lead to job dissatisfaction and to a
greater mobility of labor than expected.
Finally, Caplow [17] defined two anchor points to fix a
person's occupation. One is hereditary occupation and, at
the other extreme, the exclusive result of the individual's
characteristics. Factors of hereditary acquisition of capital
and aspirations of the parents for the offspring to achieve
more will be overwhelming factors. The latter will depend
upon education, educational opportunities, or the view of
the individual's society towards education and opportunity.
With the perspective of vocational theories in mind, it
is fairly obvious that there is no one theory that can solve
the vocational dilemma. What can generally be determined is:
1) That the average military enlistee/reenlistee will be
between 18-24.
2) During that period he will be crystallizing his career
choice, narrowing from the general down to the specific.
3) At this stage the individual is amenable to feedback,
proper development could encourage the emergence of
the Modal personality, and the emphasis on self-
evaluation by the individual.
4) The social environment of the potential enlistee or
new enlistee is his peers and usually school associates;
as such, these areas should be cultivated as far as
possible to portray the realistic content of military
life as a career.
5) Identification of the vocational stage of development
and relating that to hereditary background and prevail-
ing social and cultural conditions could assist in
eliminating the training of a portion of the population
that would provide only marginal value to the military.
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6) Provision of sufficient diversity in career pursuits,
with obvious fluidity between rank and trades to
ensure that the individual, when he settles on his
vocational preference and moves into the implementation
stage, is not thwarted and consequently does not become
dissatisfied and add to the avoidable turnover.
7) Recognition that in using contracts of employment they
should be designed to forestall the frivolous attempt
at discontinuation of service but should not irreparably
tie the individual to a way of life or vocational
following which is stultifying his development. The
loss to the individual and the potential loss for the
country as a whole far outweighs the expense unrecouped.
C. COST-EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES
These studies are being used to contrast the variation of
contractual terms of employment from a quantitative aspect as
compared to the previously discussed qualitative constraints
of attitudes and stages of development.
Like the foregoing studies, they have their limitations;
however, they exhibit a common need for the contract length
to be considerably longer than appreciated in the qualitative
studies. This is more readily apparent in the first-term
enlistment situation, where initial training and equipping
costs are to be recouped, than in the reenlistee situation.
The studies work on the premise of a contract length of
some duration, the length being a function of what the military





Enlistment has two models worthy of examination. The
first is a model that compares cost to effectiveness, equating
the recruiting and training costs of an average soldier against
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the effectiveness of the individual. The second model looks
at a change of enlistment contract period to reduce fluctua-
tions in manpower for training purposes, the aim being to
reduce the cyclical pattern of shortages and overages of
recruits. Both models are vitally concerned with contract
term of employment but they are approaching the problem from
different directions and with different objects in mind.
a. Model I
The model incorporated two aspects: one is the
consideration of effectiveness of the individual over time,
the other is the cost of the individual, cost being seen as
the initial cost of recruitment, equipping and transporting
the individual coupled with his pay and allowances for that
period.
Formulation of the model requires the derivation
of an equation for these two elements and the comparison
graphically. For simplicity, the population to be examined
are infantry soldiers recently completed Basic Combat Training
and Advanced Infantry Training but having no previous unit
experience.
Both elements in the model are considered over
time (in this case, 36 months). The use of 36 months is
justified by its present use and Congress restraints on any
lower term.
The elements of the model are dealt with separately





This term has many connota-
tions and is difficult to define. What is effectiveness for
one purpose may well be mediocrity for another.
The approach adopted was that effectiveness
was represented by the infantry soldier able to perform
certain specified functions.
These functions and the level of expertise
required to be exercised by the infantry soldier, were judge-
mental criteria determined by practicing officers and NCO ' s
.
Effectiveness was considered to be a cumu-
lative device based on the learning curve approach; as an
individual soldier acclimatises in his new unit he will
theoretically become more effective. It is well to be aware
of the history and limitations of the learning curve before
placing undue reliance on the methodology used.
(2) Learning Curve. The learning curve is
experiential and relative to its environment; as such many
people claim it should be rather called a progress curve or
experience curve. Regardless of title, learning remains the
predominant factor: the more opportunities for learning that
exist the steeper the learning curve becomes [18]
.
The learning curve concept emanated from the
aircraft industry in WW II. One study conducted in the Curtiss
Wright Corporation showed that an individual learns as he




The aircraft studies established one
important fact: that the rate of improvement is regular
enough to be predictable.
The pure learning curve is not a singular
effort; it represents the collective efforts of many people
to achieve a common task better. The view that will be
adopted here of the learning curve is that there is an inter-
action of people engrossed with the concept of achieving an
objective in a better manner. Without this approach the
singular efforts of the individual could well be to no avail.
There are definite limits to the level of
proficiency that any individual may reach in the performance
of any particular skilled activity. The prediction of this
limit is as valuable as the concept of the learning curve
itself. Reasons for non-fulfillment in actual performance
could be due to a change in motivation; people rarely work
up to the limit their capabilities impose.
A test by the psychologist Snoddy in 1926
[19] illustrated this concept. In this test he used mirror-
drawing as a skill learning task, the subject being required
to trace with a pencil along a star-shaped path while viewing
his hand in a mirror. On the basis of one trial a day for
60 days the performance was based on time and errors with a
logarithm of performance plotted against the logarithm of
trials. The result was a straight line fitting the data
indicating that improvement in performance continued over the




This study, as with others made in the area,
came to the conclusion that performance in skilled tasks
improves over long periods of time, with the rate of improve-
ment reducing as practice continues. Ultimately the slope
of the learning function depends upon the task being carried
out.
The objective in this model is to take the
concept of a learning curve and equate the level of effective-
ness as perceived by infantry officers and NCO ' s over a period
of time to observe how the function varies.
(3) Methodology Used to Determine Effectiveness.
Effectiveness was gauged by use of a questionnaire approach.
Two questionnaires were written, the first (Annex A) was put
to a pilot study of five officers and NCO ' s at Fort Ord. The
second questionnaire (Annex B) was put to a sample of 50
officers and NCO's at Fort Ord. The second questionnaire
incorporated amendments and recommendations emanating from
the pilot study of questionnaire I.
(4) Questionnaire Results
(a) Questionnaire I. For questionnaire I
there were five respondents. The questionnaire was coupled
with personal interviews. This resulted in amendments to
questions 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the original 15 questions
asked. Examinations of the results of questionnaire I revealed
the following character sketch of the individual soldier.
1) Weeks spent in BCT and AIT were 13-16 weeks.
2) Descriptively, the average soldier was seen as satis-
factorily fit, he was unable to perform some skills
taught and unable to perform some unit functions.
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3) The effectiveness of the newly arrived soldier relative
to his final effectiveness was seen as being 31-40%.
(b) Questionnaire II. This revised ques-
tionnaire was distributed within Fort Ord to 50 practicing
officers and senior NCO's of the Seventh Infantry Division.
The results were:
Returned questionnaires 11_
Returned but incomplete 5
Returned but unusable 1
Usable 21
_27
Although the questionnaires' completion
was less than optimal, the returns were sufficiently detailed
to allow a compilation of the data to take place.
Examining the 15 questions in the second
questionnaire, the most relevant for the purposes of defining
effectiveness was seen to be question 8 and question 13. In
question 8 the individual was asked to define the level of
average effectiveness of the individual. This was found to be
1) Weeks spent in BCT and AIT, 13-16 weeks.
2) Descriptively, the average soldier was seen as being of
average fitness, unable to perform some skills taught
in BCT and AIT, but able to perform most unit functions
effectively.
3) Upon arrival at the first unit the effectiveness of the
average soldier relative to his final effectiveness was
seen as approximately 40%.
In question 13 the individual was given
effectiveness percentage figures from 10 to 100 in 10% incre-
ments. He was requested to fill in appropriate effectiveness
estimates in months against these figures. The results of
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question 13 are shown in Table II. These results enabled a
regression analysis to be carried out on a time series basis.
(5) Derivation of Effectiveness Equation. The
formulae used were:
ZY = A N + A,EX + A, EX 2
o 1 2
£ XY = A ZX + A..ZX2 +A-IX 3
1 z
ZX 2Y = A EX 2 + A 1 EX 3 +A„EX'to 1 2
The constants A , A, and A~ were determined
o 1 2
and inserted in the equation.
To facilitate the use of this formula, 15
months was classified as the zero point. It then ranged down
to months and up to 30 months, thus developing the basis of
the equation.
The equation derived was:
Y = 73 + 13. 6X - 2.3X 2 .
Details showing the derivation and the methodology employed
are in Table III.
The equation is basically a trend line or
forecast device, although reasonably accurate in the range
to 25 months, it starts to lose some of its reliability at
30 months. Fortunately, little need exists to use this
extrapolation.
(6) Cost Element. The cost element is based upon
individual cost of recruiting, process/travel, training and
discharge costs. These costs are for an average individual.




Individual Responses to Question Asking
Percentage Effectiveness Over Time.
(Question 13, Questionnaire II)
Months
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34
Percentage to to to to to to to to to to to to




90 2 3 4 4 2
80 1 3 4 5 3
70 2 3 5 5 3
60 4 5 5 1 5
50 4 6 6 2 2 1
40 5 8 5 1
30 9 6 3
20 14 3 1
10 9 4










(Y) X 2 X 3 X* XY X 2 Y
-3 10 9 -27 81 -30 90
-2 5 40 4 -8 16 -80 160
-1 10 60 1 -1 1 -60 60
15 70
1 20 85 1 1 1 85 85
2 25 92 4 8 16 184 368
3 30 94 9 27 81 282 846
EX=0 EY=451 EX 2 =28 EX 3 = Ex't = 196 EXY=381 EX 2Y=1609
Note: Formula used




EXY = A EX + A, EX 2 + A 9 EX
3
o 1 2
EX 2Y = A EX 2 + A-.EX 3 + A^EX 1*
o 1 2
Derived Equation:
Y = 73 + 13. 6X - 2.3X 2
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The important thing to note is that fixed costs--i.e.,
buildings amortisation- - for the purpose of this study are
excluded on the grounds that they lack universality.
The cost elements exhibit several facets,
depending on the objective involved. Several of them could
be viewed as fixed costs recoverable over the life of the
asset--i.e., accession, initial medical, initial training
costs. This would be theoretically correct; however, for
purposes of decision-making it conceivably could distort the
analysis. The objective in this study is to determine the
shortest possible contract period. This can only be real-
istically ascertained if we have recouped initial costs as
early as practicable.
Table IV shows the accumulation of costs
incurred for the individual over a 36-month period. The
cumulative costs, when characterized as a percentage of total
costs, are matched against months. A regression analysis was
carried out to predict the cumulative cost percentage. The
resulting equation is:
Y = 2.53X + 7.591 where Y is the cumulative cost
percentage and X is months.
This linear function realistically represents
the commitment financially on the individual over a period of
time, although several elements have been averaged and others
treated as a fixed cost to be recouped early in the individual's
employment, the cost equation remains reasonably representative.
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225 1033 4 1033*
1 450 452 902 8 1935
2 450 452 902 902 12 2837
3 450 452 902 16 3739
4 450 452 902 19 4641
5 475 452 927 23 5568
6 502 10 512 25 6080
7 507 10 517 28 6597
8 507 10 517 30 7114
9 507 10 517 32 7631
10 507 10 517 34 8148
11 507 10 517 36 8665
12 507 10 517 38 9182
13 565 10 575 41 9757
14 565 10 575 43 10332
15 565 10 575 46 10907
16 565 10 575 48 11482
17 565 10 575 50 12057
18 565 10 575 53 12632
19 565 10 5 75 55 13207
20 565 10 575 58 13782
21 565 10 575 60 14357
22 565 10 575 62 14932
23 565 10 575 65 15507
24 565 10 644 68 16151
25 634 10 644 70 16795
26 634 10 644 73 17439





















10 644 76 18083
10 644 78 18727
10 644 81 19371
10 644 84 20015
10 644 86 20659
10 644 89 21303
10 644 92 21947
10 644 95 22591
10 644 97 23235
10 644 100 23879
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief








m x=X-X y=Y-Y xy X 2 y 2
4 -15.3 -42.3 647.1 234.09 1789.3
4 19 -11.3 -27.3 308.4 127.69 745.3
6 25 -9.3 -21.3 198.0 86.49 453.7
8 29 -7.3 -17.3 126.2 53.29 299.3
10 34 -5.3 -12.3 65.1 28.09 151.3
15 45 -.3 -1.3 .4 .09 1.6
20 57 4.7 10.7 50.3 22.09 114.5
25 70 9.7 23.7 229.9 94.09 561.7
30 83 14.7 36.7 539.5 216.09 1346.9

















b (X - X) (2) where )
Derived Equation:










(7) Elements Integration. Graphs of the two
equations for effectiveness and cost are depicted on Figure 4.
It would appear that up to 20 months the rate
of growth of effectiveness appears to be steep and constant.
Past 20 months the curve indicates a slowing in the rate of
effectiveness growth till finally in the period 30 to 35
months the rate of growth virtually becomes zero, and the
individual becomes as effective as he ever will be. Examin-
ing the cost curve over this same period indicates that at
the 25-month period 70% of the total costs of the individual
on a normal three-year term of enlistment are already foregone,
The additional 30% of costs due to be incurred must be weighed
against the rate of effectiveness growth of the individual for
his remaining contract period.
Exogeneous factors , such as preconceived
ideas of effectiveness equated to existing contract terms and
decline in rate of effectiveness due to impending separation,
have not been answered in this study. Suffice to say that
there is an obvious rate of effectiveness decline with
accompanying constant costs. The question to be asked is
whether this should be allowed to remain unrecognized within
our military contracts,
b. Model II
This model takes a completely different approach
to the problem of contractual employment. Instead of attempt-
ing to define effectiveness and match it against cost, it







10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 Months
Figure 4. Rate of Effectiveness and Cumulative Cost
Compared over Time. Both effectiveness and
cost are in terms of 36 months.
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within the personnel system. This cost is due to seasonality of
of quality accessions.
This model is the result of a study by the
Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel [20]. Its objective is to minimize the impact
of accession seasonality and at the same time improve personnel
readiness
.
The model proposes the implementation of a 3-1/2
year enlistment term in lieu of a 3-year and 4-year term. By
reducing the effect of training lead time there would be a
synchronising of entries to and losses from the enlisted
trained strength. The study postulated that if a mixture of
75% 3-year and 251 4-year enlistees was to continue a 3-1/2
year contract term would require 4-5% fewer accessions to
maintain the same enlisted trained strength.
With the current economic conditions recruiting
has attracted a much higher percentage than normal of high
school graduates. (High school graduate enlistee seasonality
compared to non-high school enlistees was shown in Figure 5)
.
On the assumption that high school graduate enlistees would
continue to increase, it was postulated that fluctuations in
trained strength would be dampened if a 3-1/2 year contract
was used in lieu of 3- and 4-year contracts. To support this
view Figure 6 was supplied showing the trained strength devia-
tion over time with an assumed 180,000 yearly accessions and
a mix of 75% 3-year and 25% 4-year contract people compared
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Figure 5. The Seasonality of Non-Prior Service Accessions
of High School Graduates Compared to Non-High
School Enlistees. The index value 1.0 represents
the average monthly accession during the year.
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the










Figure 6. Current Trained Strength Deviation with a
3- and 4-Year Contract Compared to the Modified
Deviation Resultant upon Implementation of the
3-1/2-Year Contract for First-Term Enlistees.
Both current and modified curves incorporate
maximum high school accession seasonality.
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel [20]
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The change to a 3-1/2 year contract would seem
to reduce the number of recruits needed to maintain enlisted
trained strength while at the same time making it easier to
schedule the use of training assets. The average enlistee
who did not reenlist would spend about five months being
trained, 36 months as a trained usable asset and the last
month being discharged.
The average availability of manpower has been
calculated [20] for the 3-year enlistee as 24.5 months; the
3-1/2 year, 27.9 months; and the 4-year, 50.4 months, based
on the assumption that the enlistee serves the first six-
months' training.
This study emphasizes the fact that there is no
one way to view contractual terms. To reduce the fluctuation
in training lead time and under or over usage of training
assets the use of a 3-1/2 year contract would assist. However,
sensitivity has not been conducted on a 1-1/2 or 2-1/2 year
contract due to Congress restraints placed upon a minimum
3-year contract period.
The conclusion remains that initial enlistment
contract terms are very much subject to the social and economic
climate. Whereas a 2-year contract may be the most cost-
effective for obtaining a return from the individual, it may
be uneconomic from the viewpoint of maximizing force viability
or utilizing training facilities available. The ultimate




Ignoring enlistment for the moment, we can ask
the same questions about reenlistment models, is there an
optimum contract period or is a contract needed at all? The
parameters differ greatly from initial enlistment, since costs
of recruiting, equipping and training are assumed recouped.
The only cost is a variable one which is based on the pay and
allowances and the accumulation of retirement rights.
Similarly, consideration of accession seasonality and training
asset underutilization becomes of little consequence.
2 . Reenlistment Model Discussion
If we acknowledge that the prime military age group
population is going to decline in future years, then it is
obvious that greater consideration must be devoted to ensuring
that present enlistees reenlist when their contract expires.
The need is generally to create an environment
sufficiently enticing to the first-term enlistee that he will
feel sufficiently motivated to reenlist. This environment
could be possibly made more attractive still by use of a more
flexible contract term; at very worst it may enable the reduc-
tion or removal of some of the more costly reenlistment
incentives presently used.
Most reenlistment models do not concern themselves
directly with what the length of the reenlistment term should
be. They do, however, look at factors that influence an indi-
vidual, to reenlist- -i. e. , predicter variables of rank and pay
and reenlistment bonus [21, 22].
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If the rank of the individual is increased when nearing
the end of his first term enlistment the probability is that
he will be more likely to reenlist. Similarly, if the reen-
listment bonus is attractive enough it will normally appeal
to the individual. What has not been considered is the pos-
sibility of reducing both or all of these incentives and
instead using contractual length as the only variable.
Concepts discussed in most reenlistment quantitative
studies assume a set term of reenlistment. Removing this




III. DISCUSSION OF ENLISTMENT AND REENLISTMENT OPTIONS
Enlistment contracts have been an accepted part of the
military establishment since time immemorial. The need for
review of this field at this time is due to present day
enlistees' qualms over contractually binding themselves for
long periods of time and consequently losing their individ-
ualism and fate control vis-a-vis their civilian industry
counterparts
.
The answer to the question of contract period must have
an awareness of two distinctly different pressure areas, one
basically psychological and the other economic.
The psychological pressure areas are represented by firstly,
the attitudes of the individual towards his position in society
and his rights and obligations relative to his civilian counter-
part and secondly, his legal position with respect to the
validity of contractual law application. Although the present
position is still clouded, what emerges from the existing case
law is that sufficient precedents exist to show that an en-
listee or reenlistee, if influenced into a course of action
by a promise (particularly with financial implications) made
by a recruiter or counsellor, has a basis for a cause of action
for either enforcement of the terms or rescission of the con-
tract. This has not drastically altered the balance of power
in the recruiting function. It has, however, resulted in a
greater degree of circumspection by many recruiting practitioners
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and can only assist the military image by recognizing the
contractual rights of the individual.
Recognition of the development of the individual also
comes under the psychological heading. Vocational career
choice is not a one time affair as many have previously
thought. Its sheer fluidity and many faceted character
necessitates that with the present enlistee population, whose
average age is 18-20 years, all options are kept open. Move-
ment between trades and skills would greatly encourage con-
tinuing service, and the costs would be negligible relative
to the present losses.
Quantitative analysis ignores the whims of the individual
for greater fate control or the prospect of stultifying an
individual's development by locking him into a set term con-
tract. Rather, the view must be what term of contract most
benefits the military at least cost.
By examining the two models under enlistment it is obvious
that there is no one answer to this question. Depending on
viewpoint the model will incorporate the variables considered
most relevant to the person concerned, concommitantly many
assumptions must be made that are inapplicable in other
contexts
.
The models proved useful in that they focussed on the
variety of returns for cash outlay that could be anticipated.
As such, the use of a singular contract for all employees,
regardless of skill acquired, would appear inequitable.
The use of a 3-1/2 year contract in Model II was attempt-
ing to maximize a totally different set of criteria to that
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in Model I. The use of this hypothetical 3-1/2 year contract
supposedly overcame the underutilization of training facilities
and smoothed trained strength manpower. Detriments of in-
creased time in fixed contract were not considered. It is
wise to couch this optimism with the acknowledgement that the
economic environment of 1975 is conducive to this type of
experimentation. A similar experiment in the early 1970's
or even possibly in the late 1970's may be doomed.
The question remains unanswered as to the optimality of
contract time. If the contract period stays at 3 or 4 years
then potential enlistees will be lost, possibly higher re-
cruiting costs incurred to attract the additional non-motivated
numbers (including larger incentives) and the increased proba-
bility of having non-reenlistment due to lack of vocational
flexibility. Conversely, if it is reduced below two years
the rate of return of effectiveness relative to cost would
still be increasing, thus encouraging quantitative analysts
to urge a longer contract period.
If the period of contract is increased to 3-1/2 years,
as Model II recommends, accession seasonality may be reduced
and training assets better used. However, will the increased
terms functionally cause additional costs to be incurred to
gain enlistees? Only a longitudinal study varying these
elements in a relatively stable economic climate will provide
the necessary answers.
The problems facing reenlistment are a follow-on from
initial enlistment. If reenlistment figures can be increased,
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the pressure to obtain accessions and the question of effec-
tiveness and use of training facilities would be purely-
academic .
The attitude adopted was that increased reenlistments
could reduce the cost to the military of training new recruits.
Of main interest were the variables identified as relevant to
reenlistment , these being: rank and diversified training,
length of enlistment, dependents, region of the country, and
mental group.
One study [22] suggested that by concentrating on 4-year
enlistees the proportion of reenlistees will be higher overall;
consequently, there could be a reduction in new enlistees.
This argument assumes that the number of 4-year initial en-
listees will be equal to the 2- or 3-year enlistees. This
could be a false premise and consequently the figures postu-
lated could prove quite misleading.
The use of the variable reenlistment bonus was seen as
having positive effect on the numbers reenlisting and varia-
tion of this was seen as a device to influence the marginal
reenlistee [21]
.
The attitudes of first-term enlistees due to reenlist
indicated that increased incentives were not necessarily the
main determinant. The need they considered was greater recog-
nition of their performance and greater fate control. The
question then is why not concentrate on the elements most
nominated as relevant, in this sense an open-ended contract
or one of short resignation notice?
60

As with initial enlistment, only a longitudinal study-
will provide the answer; however, there appears far less
grounds for set contracts on reenlistment when one considers




The models and studies all helped to focus upon the
problem of what is the optimum contract period. The result
remains that "there is no one answer."
The question of how much weighting should be attributed
to the individual's attitudes and his desire for greater fate
control or the new legal status which recognizes his rights
and objections must be contrasted to the overwhelming desire
to design contractual terms to enable the government to
maximize its return on outlay.
The streams diverge with the attitudinal approach and
cost effective approach becoming further apart the more they
individually concentrate on their own goals. The only reason-
able answer must be a blending of the two with adequate con-
cessions made by each.
Even with the cost effective studies it cannot be said
that they are uniform. The question remains what is to be
maximized or minimized and what cost is acceptable to the
government- - i. e. , nonreturn of training costs or lack of
manpower readiness, to quote but two examples.
It remains obvious that continued inflexible long term
contracts, i.e., 3-4 years, could deter prospective enlistees
or reenlistees. On the other hand, variable terms, or ones
of considerably shorter duration, could prove a boon to
short-term enlistment and reenlistment figures. The question
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is whether the result 'will prove of value to the maintenance
of a viable military force and secondly, can it be justified
on a cost basis?
The answer must be one of further longitudinal studies
using the variables discussed. The evidence would all point
to a minimum term of two years. This base figure may provide
the necessary starting element in a future study with a matrix
of population psychology, economic conditions, defense posture
and cost effectiveness considerations as elements in the
analysis. The result could show a reasonable set of alterna-
tives for differing situations.
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE I
QUESTIONNAIRE TO EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE INFANTRY SOLDIER
MILITARY COST ANALYSIS IS SUFFERING A LACK
OF INFORMATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
NEW INFANTRY SOLDIER.
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO ELICIT
YOUR OPINION AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER'S
EFFECTIVENESS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
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PART I RATER'S PERSONAL BACKGROUND
Circle all answers where provided.





13 - 15 years
Other
2. ARE YOU AN OFFICER?
YES NO
3. IF AN OFFICER, HAVE YOU SPENT ANY PERIOD OF YOUR SERVICE
IN THE MILITARY AS AN ENLISTED MAN?
YES NO








6. IF NO TO QUESTION FOUR
,
HAVE YOU COMMANDED/CONTROLLED





Other (If Other , do not complete remainder of
questionnaire)
.
PART II EFFECTIVENESS SECTION
Questions in this section apply only to soldiers
who have completed BCT, AIT but have had no
previous unit experience.
7. HOW LONG, ON THE AVERAGE, HAD EACH INFANTRY SOLDIER BEEN
IN BCT, AIT BEFORE HE ARRIVED IN YOUR UNIT?
0-4 weeks 25 - 28 weeks
5-8 weeks 29 - 32 weeks
9-12 weeks 33 - 36 weeks
13 - 16 weeks 37 - 40 weeks
17 - 20 weeks 41 - 44 weeks
21 - 24 weeks 45 - 48 weeks
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOLDIER IS DEFINED AS :
-
a) Physically fit.
b) Able to perform all skills taught in BCT and AIT
c) Functions efficiently as a unit member.
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8. DEFINE THE LEVEL OF "MINIMUM" EFFECTIVENESS ACCEPTABLE
FOR THE NEWLY ARRIVED SOLDIER (Circle response applicable)
Physical Condition :
Totally Unfit Slightly Unfit Satisfactorily Above Average Excellent
Fit Fitness Fitness







Performs most Performs all







Unable to Unable to Performs most Performs all Performs all
perform most perform some unit functions unit functions unit functions
unit functions unit functions effectively effectively excellently
9. DEFINE THE LEVEL OF "AVERAGE" EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE NEWLY
ARRIVED SOLDIER (Circle response applicable)
Physical Condition :
Totally unfit Slightly unfit Satisfactorily Above average Excellent
fit fitness fitness









Performs all Performs all





Unable to Unable to Performs most
perform most perform some unit functions
unit functions unit functions effectively
Performs all Performs all




10. UPON ARRIVAL AT YOUR UNIT HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE AVERAGE
SOLDIER RELATIVE TO HIS FINAL EFFECTIVENESS AS AN
INFANTRY SOLDIER IN YOUR UNIT?
- 10% 51 - 601
11 - 201 61 - 70
21 - 301 71 - 80%
31 - 40% 81 - 90%
41 - 50% 91 - 100%
11. HOW LONG IN MONTHS, FROM THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE
INFANTRY SOLDIER TILL HE WAS FULLY EFFECTIVE AS A SOLDIER
IN YOUR UNIT?
(Write in) Months
12. FURTHER TO QUESTION 11, WHERE PREVIOUSLY A SINGLE FIGURE
FOE EFFECTIVENESS IN MONTHS WAS ASKED, NOW SHOW YOUR
ESTIMATE OF THE INDIVIDUALS ' S EARLIEST AND LATEST TIMES
TILL HE BECAME A FULLY EFFECTIVE SOLDIER IN YOUR UNIT.





13. USING THE RESPONSES GIVEN IN QUESTIONS 10 AND 11,
SHOW THE LEVEL OF "AVERAGE" EFFECTIVENESS ATTAINED
MONTHLY
.













14. DO YOU THINK THAT HAVING A FIXED MILITARY TERM OF
SERVICE IS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE MILITARY?
YES N
15. PLEASE COMMENT ON YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 14
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE II
QUESTIONNAIRE TO EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE INFANTRY SOLDIER
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DESIGNED TO ELICIT
YOUR OPINION AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS
EFFECTIVENESS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
This Questionnaire was prepared by Captain
P. J. Spence of the Royal Australian Army
Ordnance Corp as part of his study for a
Master of Science in Management at the
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.
Course No: MN0810
Course Title: Thesis, titled Contractual Employment
What are the Alternatives?
Second Reader Approval
Chairman of Department Approval
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PART I RATER'S PERSONAL BACKGROUND
Circle all answers where provided.




10 - 12 years
13 - 15 years
Other
2. ARE YOU AN OFFICER:
YES NO
3. IF AN OFFICER, HAVE YOU SPENT ANY PERIOD OF YOUR SERVICE
IN THE MILITARY AS AN ENLISTED MAN?
YES NO








6. IF NO TO QUESTION FIVE
,
HAVE YOU COMMANDED/ CONTROLLED
INFANTRY TROOPS WITHIN THE LAST:
0-12 months
13 - 24 months
25 - 36 months
Other (If Other
,
do not complete ramainder of
questionnaire)
.
PART II EFFECTIVENESS SECTION
Questions in this section apply only to soldiers
who have completed BCT, AID but have had no previous
unit experience. (Answers to this question could
refer to your past unit experience and not necessarily
your present unit which could be newly formed)
.
THIS QUESTION APPLIES ONLY TO NEWLY ARRIVED SOLDIERS
IN YOUR UNIT.
7. HOW LONG, ON THE AVERAGE, HAD EACH INFANTRY SOLDIER BEEN
IN BCT, AIT BEFORE HE ARRIVED IN YOUR UNIT?
0-4 weeks 25 - 28 weeks
5-8 weeks 29 - 32 weeks
9-12 weeks 33 - 36 weeks
13 - 16 weeks 37 - 40 weeks
17 - 20 weeks 41 - 44 weeks
21 - 24 weeks 45 - 48 weeks
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOLDIER IS DEFINED AS :
-
a) Physically fit.
b) Able to perform all skills taught in BCT and AIT.
c) Functions efficiently as a unit member.
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8. DEFINE THE LEVEL OF "AVERAGE " EFFECTIVENESS OBSERVED FOR
THE NEWLY ARRIVED SOLDIER (Circle response applicable)
Physical Condition :











Performs most Performs all







Unable to Unable to Performs most Performs all Performs all
perform most perform some unit functions unit functions unit functions
unit functions unit functions effectively effectively excellently
9. DEFINE THE LEVEL OF "MINIMUM" EFFECTIVENESS ACCEPTABLE FOR
THE NEWLY ARRIVED SOLDIER (Circle response applicable)
Physical Condition :





















Unable to Unable to Performs most Performs all Performs all
perform most perform some unit functions unit functions unit functions
unit functions unit functions effectively effectively excellently
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10. UPON ARRIVAL AT YOUR UNIT HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE AVERAGE
SOLDIER RELATIVE TO HIS FINAL EFFECTIVENESS AN AN
INFANTRY SOLDIER IN YOUR UNIT?
- 101 51 - 60%
11 - 20% 61 - 70%
21 - 30% 71 - 80%
31 - 40% 81 - 90%
41 - 50% 91 - 100%
11. HOW LONG IN MONTHS, FROM THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE
INFANTRY SOLDIER TILL HE WAS ACCEPTABLY EFFECTIVE IN
THE PARTICULAR JOB ASSIGNED WITHIN THE UNIT:
(Write in) Months
WHAT WAS THE PERCENTAGE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN HIS JOB AT THIS TIME? % (This may never be
100% as the individual will be continually learning)
.
12. FURTHER TO QUESTION U, WHERE PREVIOUSLY A SINGLE FIGURE
FOR EFFECTIVENESS IN MONTHS WAS ASKED, NOW SHOW YOUR
ESTIMATE OF A GROUP'S EARLIEST AND LONGEST TIMES TILL






13. USING THE RESPONSES GIVEN IN QUESTIONS 10 AND 11,
SHOW THE NUMBER OF MONTHS REQUIRED BY THE INDIVIDUAL








14. DO YOU THINK THAT HAVING A FIXED MILITARY TERM OF
SERVICE IS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE MILITARY?
YES NO
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